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THEORIZING CLASS, GENDER, AND THE 
LAW: THREE APPROACHES 
ANGELA P. HARRIS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
“Class” is a peculiar category in American life and law. Although 
Americans are no strangers to class struggle, and at various points in our history 
have participated in lively debates over economic rights and social citizenship 
(not to mention bloody labor struggles),1 most people in the United States at 
present do not understand “class” as a crucial category either for personal 
identity or for political struggle. 
Our legal system, moreover, helps to obscure class relations in the United 
States. Our eighteenth-century national constitution lacks economic or social 
rights. Americans perceive, instead, a bright line between the “public” world of 
rights and the “private” world of market arrangements. In terms of ideology, we 
have a split-level system of governance: democratic at one level, with state-
backed commitments to equality and dignity, and capitalist at the other, with 
commitments to inequality and submission to the discipline of market forces.2 
Despite the harsh consequences of market rule, so obvious in this time of 
economic downturn, coercion is conventionally identified with the public 
sphere, whereas the world of the market—despite its stark inequalities—is 
understood to be “free.”3 In the material world, as opposed to ideology, 
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 1. See generally William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship] (comparing and contrasting two 
constitutional traditions: a countermajoritarian tradition aimed at preventing racial subordination, and 
a majoritarian tradition favoring economic equality); William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic 
Citizenship: Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 697 (2000) (comparing the histories of the civil rights and labor movements in the United 
States); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001) (describing 
the New Deal vision of social citizenship). 
 2. Kermit Gordon, Foreword to ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG 
TRADEOFF, at vii (1975). 
 3. For a Legal Realist critique of this ideology, see for example Robert L. Hale, Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). For a more recent version, 
see ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE, SOCIETY, AND CORPORATE POWER 17 (Marc R. Tool & Warren J. 
Samuels eds., 1989). For a historical excavation of this ideology, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal 
Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, the Illusion of Free Markets (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working 
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however, governance at all levels in the United States is both state- and market-
driven, to varying degrees. As the Legal Realists pointed out long ago, there is 
no such thing as a “free market” without the backstop of state coercion to 
enforce private promises.4 And as contemporary administrative law scholars 
have noted, in the last few decades enthusiasm for pure “command and control” 
regulation by the state has declined, and governance of regulated industries has 
comprised a mixture of market mechanisms and state directives.5 
The near absence of class as a folk category in the contemporary United 
States makes analysis tricky. Part of the work of theorizing gender and class is 
to tease out scholarly from popular uses of these terms. Our split-level 
governance system also contributes to the trickiness of class analysis: because 
we tend to speak of the economic and state spheres as distinct and opposed, 
tracing the intricate interconnections between them is difficult. 
A third obstacle to analysis worth mentioning at the outset is that to the 
extent that class functions at all in popular life, it does so as an identity category 
as well as a category of structural analysis. The social theorist, then, must take 
care to distinguish class as it has functioned to give individuals and collectives a 
sense of identity from class as a structure of power within which people live, 
whether they recognize it or not. 
A fourth tricky thing for the theorist of class is the fact that class, like race 
and gender, is simultaneously symbolic and material. For example, gender 
marks material differences between groups of people, as concepts like “the 
feminization of poverty” indicate. At the same time, gender is a powerful 
language that we use to represent relations, not only among persons, but also 
among ideas or practices.6 In addition, the material and the symbolic uses of 
gender influence one another. At the symbolic level, for instance, we imagine 
women to be naturally better at caring for children than men, and this leads to a 
society where in fact women do the lion’s share of care work (but mostly 
outside the market, since child care is so “natural” for women). 
Similarly, when using class as a tool of institutional analysis (as opposed to 
an individual or collective identity category), the theorist must be aware that 
class analysis comes with inherited cultural meanings. Even though class looks 
more “objective” than, say, race—because economic relations are based in 
material reality in a way that race relations arguably are not—economic 
relations, economic institutions, and class relations all come with sometimes-
unrecognized symbolic systems, whether Marxist (the source of fantasies about 
the “proletariat” poised for revolution) or capitalist (the source of fantasies 
 
Paper No. 433 (2d series), Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 238, 2008), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1278067. 
 4. See Hale, supra note 3. 
 5. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546–47 
(2000). 
 6. See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY ix–xiii (1999). 
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about captains of industry, unfettered by the state, leading the way to riches for 
everyone without regard for ecological limits). 
The symbolic meanings of these categories are, finally, loaded heavily with 
politics freight. Categories like male and female, black and white, rich and poor, 
acquire their meanings in an unequal and exploitative society; indeed, it could 
be argued that categories like “race” were invented precisely to justify 
exploitative social relations. Nevertheless, the politically loaded quality of these 
terms is obscured by a thick layer of justifying ideology. The work of justifying 
inequality is usually rooted in an underlying dichotomy in western thought: 
nature versus culture, or, as the anthropologist Levi-Strauss famously put it, 
between “the raw and the cooked.”7 Gender and race, in particular, have been 
imagined to be immutable, natural traits of human beings, allowing us to 
imagine that the social practices we associate with “masculine” or “feminine,” 
or “civilized” or “savage,” simply are that way and cannot be changed.8 An 
analysis of how gender and class are interrelated, then, must be  sensitive to the 
dynamic production of rhetorical opposites—“binary oppositions,” as the 
Critical Legal Studies movement named them9—that serve to make existing 
social practices and relations seem natural, normal, and necessary. 
With all of these difficulties in mind, I argue in this paper that we may 
explore the connections between gender and class along at least three distinct 
analytical paths (and probably more). The most familiar level of analysis is to 
take gender or class (or both) as identity categories. From a doctrinal 
perspective, employment discrimination law is one obvious place where issues 
of gender and class as aspects of personal identity frequently arise, as 
employees and employers struggle over the extent to which gender 
performances may be penalized—or demanded—in the workplace. 
A second, somewhat less-familiar, analytical approach to the relationship 
between gender and class is rooted in the tradition of socialist or materialist 
feminism, and examines gender as a way of structuring and justifying economic 
practices and institutions. This  structural analysis  looks at the role of the “sex–
gender system” in shaping what kinds of labor people perform, what labor 
 
 7. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED: INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE OF 
MYTHOLOGY 1 (1966). 
 8. Class, in contrast, would seem to be obviously the product of human making and therefore 
relatively less important in determining human social relations. Yet the impulse to suture social 
practices to “just-so” stories about human nature is visible in discussions of economic relations as well. 
As Chantal Thomas has observed, market forces are conventionally discussed as if they were 
nonhuman phenomena, like the weather. Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1451, 1479 (2000) (“Accounts of globalization tend to portray it as 
autonomous—a self-powered juggernaut whose appearance on the horizon has caught governments 
off-guard.”); see also Martha T. McCluskey, How Equality Became Elitist: The Cultural Politics of 
Economics from the Court to the “Nanny Wars,” 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1291, 1295 (2005) (“The 
conventional wisdom assumes that questions of ‘economic efficiency’ (at least in theory) involve 
objective, scientific, universal principles conducive to national and international harmonization in the 
interest of all.”). 
 9. Peter C. Schnack, Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory 
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2530 (1992). 
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counts as work, and who does what sort of work. The most familiar path of 
inquiry along these lines is how the nineteenth-century ideology of family and 
gender—“domesticity”—continues to influence present-day economic 
relations.10 Another avenue for the exploration of gender, class, and social 
structure is how questions of labor, work, and dependency shape public 
conceptions of citizenship.11 
The third and least familiar path into theorizing the relationship between 
gender and class considers what I will call person-making.12 Law, allied with 
what Michel Foucault called “disciplinary power,” not only grants people rights 
(or not). It also shapes who counts as a person and what kinds of experiences 
human bodies will have before being recognized as rights-bearing individuals. 
At the level of person-making, two places where state and market regulation of 
human bodies converge, marking the interaction of gender and class, are sex 
work and gender violence. Like racism, which Ruth Gilmore defines as “the 
state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-
differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death,”13 at the level of person-
making, gender and class together subject individuals to group-differentiated 
vulnerability to violence, injury, and premature death. Gender and class 
attributions also help determine to what extent humans will be recognized 
socially and legally as full and legitimate persons before the law. 
These three perspectives correspond roughly with three familiar styles of 
feminist analysis: liberal feminism, socialist feminism, and dominance feminism. 
Because feminism begins with taking women and gender seriously, it is not 
surprising that feminism would be a great resource in understanding the 
relationship between gender and class. A thorough exploration of feminist 
theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but examining various strands of that 
theory can illuminate the analysis of gender, class, and law. 
II 
GENDER, CLASS, AND IDENTITY 
Perhaps in part because of our constitutional history and the dominance of 
the Equal Protection Clause in defining and defending individual constitutional 
rights, United States antidiscrimination law is shaped by the politics of identity. 
Antidiscrimination law makes it unlawful to treat people differently based on 
certain ascribed social identities—notably, race and gender identities—without 
 
 10. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 1 (2000); see also CATHERINE ALBISTON, RIGHTS ON LEAVE: INSTITUTIONAL 
INEQUALITY, RIGHTS MOBILIZATION, AND THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (forthcoming 2010).  
 11. This is the aspect of citizenship Linda Bosniak associates with “identification and solidarity.” 
See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 479 (2000). 
 12. For those interested in Foucauldian theory, Foucault’s concept of “subjection” corresponds 
roughly to what I mean by person-making. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 202–03 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). 
 13. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Race and Globalization, in GEOGRAPHIES OF GLOBAL CHANGE: 
REMAPPING THE WORLD 261 (R.J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, & Michael J. Watts eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
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a very good reason. In social life outside the law, however, humans, both 
individually and collectively, treat  identity categories as central to their life 
experiences and their very personhood. 
Gender is perhaps the central identity category in many people’s lives. And 
such is the respect the law has for gender identity that the Supreme Court 
requires only a medium level of scrutiny for legislative and regulatory actions 
that treat people differently according to gender. Nevertheless, state action that 
classifies people by gender must meet the constitutional test of serving an 
important government interest.14 Things are quite different with respect to class, 
however. Neither in law nor in social life today is class considered an important 
part of American identity. It would be considered unusual to consciously 
discriminate in employment and education against poor people or rich people, 
for example. Nevertheless, Americans do recognize class as a social hierarchy. 
In the folk language of the contemporary United States, class is a form of 
status relation,15 and Americans most commonly use ideas about “taste” to 
define themselves and one another along class lines. Taste is evident in the 
things one has, or aspires to have, and having “good” taste or not displays to 
others where one is (or hopes to be) in the economic hierarchy.16 Taste, 
therefore, has a lot to do with consumption. What you buy, or have, says a lot 
about where you are in the class hierarchy. Taste also has something to do with 
the way one speaks and acts, quite apart from the things one has. Popular 
culture, especially advertisements and television programs, is a powerful 
medium for shaping and transmitting class meanings through developing a 
national lexicon of “taste.”17 By watching television, we learn what kinds of 
things and behaviors represent “good” taste and which represent “bad” taste, 
and taste tracks social class. Everyone “knows” in the United States, for 
example, that people who live in mobile homes are likely to be loud, 
uneducated, and tacky. Television show hosts like Jerry Springer and Maury 
Povich specialize in putting “low class” people on stage, where they both horrify 
and fascinate people who consider themselves “above” that kind of appearance 
and behavior. In this way, an employer might indeed attempt to screen out 
potential employees who appear “low class.” 
How do gender and class play out as identities in the law? The state’s role in 
regulating gender and class as identities is perhaps most visible in employment 
 
 14. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722 (1982); see also Molly Dragiewicz & 
Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical Data for Lawyers Considering 
Equal Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 241–42 (2009); David Fintz, The 
Women’s Right to Participate in the Game of Baseball, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 641, 652–53 
(2009). 
 15. Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 800–02 (2003). 
 16. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce 
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2008). 
 17. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR & DOUGLAS HOLT, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY READER 
(2000); see also JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE DON’T 
NEED 3–24 (1998). 
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law. In the 1970s, gender began to be a protected category in antidiscrimination 
law, and employment practices have been greatly affected by this shift. Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 for example, employers may no 
longer bar workers from certain jobs or condone their harassment by other 
employees simply because of their gender; to do so is “sex discrimination.”19 
Under the equal protection clause, government classifications based on gender 
are subject to being struck down as invalid unless the government can show that 
they serve an important state interest and do not simply reflect and reinforce 
popular stereotypes about men and women.20 
“Class,” as we have rendered it here, has no such similar protection under 
American law. Employers are free to impose standards of appearance and 
conduct that are associated with middle-class rather than lower-class taste. In 
most situations, this would not even be considered “discrimination.” Everyone 
is expected to aspire to leave the lower and working classes and join the middle 
class in one’s possessions, appearance, and behavior. However, there are 
situations we can recognize where the concept of “class discrimination” does 
make sense—because class intertwines with region and race. 
Class prejudice in the United States is entwined with race. The pejorative 
term “trailer trash,” or even more pointedly, “white trash,” is used to express 
contempt for lower-class white people, and is especially applied to poor white 
people from the South.21 Anti-black prejudice overlaps substantially with class 
prejudice; when middle-class black people are praised by whites for being 
“articulate,” it reflects the prejudice that most black people are not capable of 
speaking in Standard English, and more broadly, are ignorant and uneducated, 
as poor people are presumed to be. In workplace relations, unspoken class 
prejudices may inform employer-imposed grooming standards, although these 
prejudices are not actionable unless they are played out in race or gender terms, 
or both. 
Consider, for example, the case of Hollins v. Atlantic Company, Inc.22 
Hollins sued her employer under Title VII, alleging disparate treatment on the 
basis of race in applying the company’s personal grooming standards to Hollins’ 
hairstyle. Hollins wore “finger waves” to work, which she alleged were neat and 
well-groomed, but her employer said the style was too “eye-catching” and 
therefore inappropriate.23 Hollins was told to seek approval of her hairstyles in 
advance by presenting her supervisor with pictures of the styles she wanted to 
 
 18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–e-4 (2006)). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. at § e-2. 
 20. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278–79 (1979). 
 21. See MATT WRAY, NOT QUITE WHITE: WHITE TRASH AND THE BOUNDARIES OF WHITENESS 
1 (2006). 
 22. Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999). I thank LaToya Franklyn for bringing this 
case to my attention. 
 23. Id. at 655. 
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try. Hollins continued to adopt new hairstyles that her employer deemed 
inappropriate, including a ponytail and braids. Hollins eventually filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then filed 
suit in federal court. At the trial level, she lost on a motion for summary 
judgment, but on appeal before the Sixth Circuit, the court determined that a 
jury could reasonably infer that Atlantic’s grooming policy was applied in a 
manner that was racially discriminatory.24 
Hollins is visibly about race because Hollins was African American and the 
hairstyles she sought to adopt are associated with African Americans. But class 
also may have played a role in the conflict between Hollins and her employer. 
Finger waves, for example, are associated with a self-presentation that is 
derisively called by some in popular culture “ghetto fabulous;” like gold “grills” 
that cover one’s teeth and extremely long and elaborately decorated fingernails, 
certain styles of braids and ponytails are associated with working-class or 
underclass black people. Employment discrimination in this context may in fact 
be “compound discrimination,” simultaneously involving gender, race, and 
class. The class component, however, is submerged in the gender and race 
components, both in law and perhaps in popular understanding. 
Gender and class, interacting with race, have shaped not only the fortunes of 
individual employees but the culture of entire workplaces. The history of sexual 
harassment of women attempting to integrate job categories such as firefighter, 
police officer, and construction worker can be read not just as a story of 
antipathy to women, but also as a story about the collective efforts of groups of 
men to protect a certain kind of class-driven masculine identity. Sociologists of 
gender identify two broad, masculine gender-classes: professional, upper-
middle to upper-class men, who aspire to “manliness”—an identity based on 
raw intelligence and the triumph of reason over emotion (think the high-tech 
industry)—and working-class, non-professional men, who aspire to a 
conception of “masculinity,” an identity based on superior bodily strength and a 
rude, crude, but down-to-earth, non-effete personality (think “Joe Six-Pack”).25 
Both white-collar and blue-collar workplace cultures may be perceived by 
women as “boys’ clubs,” permeated with gendered behaviors. The presence of 
women in a workplace or job category that is socially understood to require 
masculinity or manliness threatens to disrupt the “homosocial” bonding that 
often stabilizes these boys’ clubs, and may even threaten the gender identities of 
the male workers. 
Antidiscrimination law has also recognized this kind of gender-class 
subordination, although once again the class component is submerged. The law 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Historically, “manliness” was associated with whiteness, and “masculinity” with blackness. For 
an examination of how “masculinity” emerged as a new form of manhood in the late nineteenth 
century, through discourses of race, class, and “civilization, see generally GAIL BEDERMAN, 
MANLINESS AND CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1880–1917 (1995). 
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of “hostile environment” sexual harassment protects women who are personally 
attacked and belittled in boys’ club working environments, when these attacks 
take the form of disparaging comments or unwanted sexual attention.26 
Legal intervention from the perspective of gender  as identity comprises the 
long-standing liberal feminist agenda: better, possibly state-subsidized, child 
care; tough enforcement of sex-discrimination laws; better workplace policies to 
support work–life balance, and a restructuring of social welfare policy to avoid 
the invidious distinctions between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” in 
favor of policies that support women and men at all class levels participating 
fully in both meaningful work and meaningful personal life.27 This agenda might 
be of particular interest to working-class women needing jobs that pay a living 
wage and access to good-quality child care. But it is difficult to imagine an 
agenda for legal change based on a desire to protect lower-class culture or 
identity as such, because most Americans born in humble circumstances, 
though they may be proud of their original identity as “Jenny from the block,” 
are meanwhile also striving to collect the income, and the status markers of 
luxury and privilege, that spell wealth.28 If we approach gender and class from 
an identity perspective, then, class is and perhaps ought to be subsumed within 
more legally and socially salient forms of discrimination. 
III 
GENDER AND CLASS: A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
Socialist feminists have long argued that, quite apart from personal identity, 
the gender divide is central to economic relations of production, consumption, 
and exchange as we know them.29 From this perspective, class is best analyzed 
not as “taste,” or a form of social status, but rather in Marxian terms as a system 
of exploitation.30 Under traditional Marxian analysis, capitalism produces two 
 
 26. Critics have charged, however, that the jurisprudence of Title VII focuses too much on 
workplace sexuality as the problem, rather than the exclusion of women. See, e.g., L. Camille Hébert, 
Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 567 (1995); Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1689 (1998). 
 27. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers’ 
Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029 (2004). 
    28.  Feminist legal theorist Ruthann Robson quotes cultural critic John Guillory on this point. “For while it is 
easy enough to conceive of a self-affirmative racial or sexual identity, it makes very little sense to posit an 
affirmative lower-class identity, as such an identity would have to be grounded in the experience of deprivation 
per se. Acknowledging the existence of admirable and even heroic elements of working-class culture, the 
affirmation of lower-class identity is hardly compatible with a program for the abolition of want.” JOHN 
GUILLORY, CULTURAL CAPITAL: THE PROBLEM OF LITERARY CANON FORMATION 13 (1993), quoted in 
Ruthann Robson, To Market, To Market; Considering Class in the Context of Lesbian Legal Theories and 
Reforms, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 176 (1995). Robson, nevertheless, supports legal protection 
based solely on class identity. 
 29. Adrienne D. Davis, Foreword: Straightening It Out: Joan Williams on Unbending Gender, 49 
AM. U.L. REV. 823, 849 (2000). 
 30. For a primer on the many different uses of the term “class,” including its functions within 
Marxist theory, see Erik Olin Wright, Class, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY (George Ritzer ed., 
2004). 
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broad classes related by exploitation: those who own the means of economic 
production and thus are able to profit from the labor of workers (capitalists), 
and workers, who own only their own labor power and must sell it to capitalists 
in order to survive. A Marxist feminist might add that both capitalists and 
workers reap the benefits of the unpaid labor of women within the household. 
Capitalists benefit indirectly through access to a pool of “ideal workers” 
available full-time for their entire careers, undistracted by the demands of 
family life; workers benefit directly from their ability to outsource care work to 
women. In this way, “productive” labor is supported by “reproductive” labor—
the labor involved in keeping workers fed, clothed, and otherwise cared-for; the 
labor of socializing and caring for children who are too young to work; and the 
labor of caring for the elderly who are too old to work. 
For theorists who analyze gender and class from a structural perspective, 
then, the market cannot be understood apart from the family, and the family 
and the market together constitute a single economic system. In modern times, 
this economic system is justified and perpetuated by reference to a powerful 
story about gender. Under the ideology of “domesticity,” which was elaborately 
articulated in the United States in the late nineteenth century, men and women 
were to occupy different spheres of social life: men were to participate in the 
market as wage laborers, and women to be leaders in family relations, 
performing unpaid work both to reproduce the next generation and to care for 
the declining older generation.31 This ideology, in turn, drew on gendered 
conceptions of national citizenship, under which civic obligations for men 
included the obligation to serve in the military and to pay taxes, and civic 
obligations for women were owed not to the state at all but to the head of the 
household.32 The ideology of domesticity was a response to the changing nature 
of work in nineteenth-century America, as production moved into factories and 
away from individual households, white working men struggled to distinguish 
“wage slavery” from actual slavery, seeking a sense of pride and dignity in wage 
work.33 
Economic activity, to make a long story short, is gendered, and it has fallen 
to feminist scholars and activists not only to seek to change the gender 
meanings of wage work but also to expand the definition of “work” itself to 
include unpaid work in the home.34 This struggle is far from over. For example, 
 
 31. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as 
Tradition, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2001). 
 32. Linda K. Kerber, “A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . Ladies”: Women, Civic 
Obligation, and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 96, 105 (1993). 
 33. See DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 66 (3d ed. 2007). 
 34. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Kathryn Abrams, The Second 
Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1605 (2001); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A 
Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 
(1998); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403 (2001); Jill Elaine 
Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005); Gillian Lester, A Defense of 
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contemporary welfare regulations continue to express popular understandings 
of fitness for full citizenship. When the federal programs we call “welfare” were 
instituted, payments were granted so that mothers without husbands could stay 
at home and care for their children. Today, mothers receiving TANF 
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) are expected to engage in wage 
work in order to be considered deserving of state economic support.35 Wage 
work is the opposite of dependency in contemporary life, and to be considered 
dependent (as are children and people whose disabilities prevent full 
participation in the workforce) is to be unfit for full citizenship.36 
Another result of the gendering of wage work is the male-derived norm of 
the “ideal worker.” As Joan Williams argues, most of the “good jobs” in the 
United States, whether they are white-collar or blue-collar, require forty hours 
or more of labor per week, regular face time in the workplace, and a career 
trajectory unbroken by time off to care for family.37 As Noah Zatz puts it, 
[T]he welfare state purports to follow a neutral principle of supporting productive 
workers and disclaims the notion that full citizenship is reserved for men and those 
who follow conventionally masculine life courses; it just so happens that those 
identified as workers are disproportionately men, thereby systematically leaving 
women marginalized and insecure.38 
The result is that workers made vulnerable by gender expectations, such as 
mothers of small children, are under enormous pressure: they must both 
participate in full-time wage work and perform to the gender standard that 
women should be the primary caretakers of children and the elderly within the 
family.39 Income and wealth, however, influence how individual mothers 
perceive and are able to respond to these pressures. Mothers closer to the top of 
the income and wealth pyramid have the choice to cease wage work and devote 
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themselves exclusively to family work, or to outsource the menial aspects of 
their care work to lower-class, especially immigrant, women.40 Toward the 
bottom of the income and wealth pyramid, mothers have far fewer good 
choices, and may find themselves compromising both their family and their 
wage work responsibilities in an effort to do it all.41 
Domesticity lingers as a cultural ideal: submission to economic discipline at 
work plus “family values” at home equals full social citizenship. From this 
perspective, what Libby Adler identifies as “the gay agenda”—the drive for 
same-sex marriage that has dominated gay–lesbian organizing in the past 
decade42—can be seen as a bid by queer people for social citizenship. Adler and 
others argue that the campaign for same-sex marriage has been waged in deeply 
assimilationist ways, assimilationist not only in the “normalization” of what it 
means to be queer (those not in line for marriage licenses are currently 
marginalized) but in its acceptance of the ideology of social citizenship under 
domesticity: full-time wage work in the public sphere, marriage and family in 
the private.43 
Despite the continuing cultural appeal of the family-market, public-private 
split, however, domesticity no longer accurately describes the American work 
force.  Increasing economic pressures on American households, including 
stagnant or falling real wages and rising health care costs, and the effects of the 
feminist movement for gender equality in law, policy, and society have made it 
untenable and, for many, undesirable for most households to compose 
themselves of one male, full-time wage worker plus one female, full-time 
homemaker, accompanied by their child dependents. It is women, however, 
who have borne the brunt of the move away from domesticity. The shortfalls in 
care of children and the elderly that are the result of women moving into the 
work force are popularly understood as the fault of women collectively, and the 
responsibility of individual women. Facing the contemporary gender 
expectation that women should “have it all”—that they should perform 
flawlessly as ideal workers in the workplace while simultaneously devoting 
themselves selflessly to motherhood—women, especially mothers, find 
themselves judging one another’s choices. Commentators, meanwhile, blame 
feminism for the ever-constricting vise in which the neoliberal state is squeezing 
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the family sector.44 The virtue of seeing gender as an integral part of political 
economy is the recognition that this is not a problem that either individuals or 
reformist social policy can solve. 
What would legal and political reform look like in a structural analysis of 
gender and class? To begin with, socialist feminists have long criticized the 
public–private dichotomy in law and society, which is frequently used to 
stabilize the opposition of market and family and the opposition of both to the 
state. In her foundational article, The Family and the Market, Frances Olsen 
examined the intricate interlocking rhetorical structures by which “the market,” 
“the family,” and “the state” are figured as public or as private: the family is 
consistently considered private, the state, public, but the market can be 
portrayed as either depending on which other sphere it is being opposed to.45 
The falsity in this rhetorical structure, as has been pointed out by critical legal 
scholars since the Legal Realism movement of the 1920s, is that no dichotomy 
between public and private exists: the state, the market, and the family are each 
a complex network of institutions and practices governed by both state and 
nonstate forms of power. 
The “private” family, for instance is shaped by mandates that emanate from 
the state as well as from our culture. Marjorie Shultz observes, 
Although paeans to the family have typically emphasized its sanctity and “privacy,” 
much of legal tradition and commentary has assumed that the family should be 
publicly regulated. Conventional morality espoused unequivocal “right” answers 
regarding family matters, and the law encoded them as status relations. For most of 
America’s legal history, family law has imposed those status prescriptions on 
individuals’ intimate lives (e.g., gendered sex roles in marriage, criteria and 
consequences of illegitimacy of children). The post-sixties decades brought a loosening 
of family law’s traditional directives, but a resurgent demand for legal enforcement of 
“family values” has recently emerged. Evidently, many citizens still prefer a 
mandatory and normative family policy.46 
Legal theorists have performed similar deconstructions on the private 
market: market relations are always laced through with state regulation, direct 
and indirect.47 Even the public state relies as much on private social norms and 
agreements as on the threat of organized force.48 
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HARRIS 4/29/2010  3:23:30 PM 
Fall 2009] THEORIZING CLASS, GENDER, AND THE LAW 49 
At the symbolic level, as critical scholars have noticed, the public–private 
split, entangled as it is with the gender-making domesticity system that has 
marked out family, work, and market as separate spheres, has infused spheres 
of legal analysis and regimes of governance themselves with gendered 
meanings, creating hierarchies of value. Shultz, for example, notes that the laws 
and forms of governance associated with commercial law are treated, even 
within legal scholarship, teaching, and analysis, as more important than those 
associated with family law.49 Judith Resnik contends that “[i]n the subject areas 
of procedure and federal courts, if one wants to say that something is 
unimportant, a stock phrase (if one chooses to use it) is available—that 
something is just ‘a housekeeping rule.’”50 Catharine MacKinnon observes a 
similar hierarchy between public and private realms in the Supreme Court’s 
decision that the civil-rights provisions of the Violence Against Women Act 
went beyond the power of Congress to enforce,51 crossing the boundary between 
“gender relations” and “commerce.”52 As several other scholars have noted, 
female legal scholars are still being advised to stay away from “women’s issues,” 
as those are considered trivial compared with the rigorous and demanding study 
of, for example, corporate law.53 
If we are to employ a structural analysis of gender and class, therefore, the 
first step is to drop the misleading designations of public and private, and 
examine how all spheres—family, market, and state—must be reconstructed in 
order to permit a better balance between individual autonomy and collective 
interdependence. Joan Williams’ “reconstructive feminism” proposes to do this 
by eliminating the “ideal worker” norm in both the workplace and in family 
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law, and reconstructing market work so that persons of all genders and family 
structures will be able to better balance workplace and family.54 Linda McClain, 
working from another direction, seeks to bring state governance further into 
family relations by explicitly recognizing the civic functions of parenthood.55 
Barbara Woodhouse, from still another direction, identifies the toxic social 
environment that contemporary capitalism generates as one of the greatest 
harms to children and child-rearing and, following the model of 
environmentalism, wishes to tame the market in order to free the family.56 
Martha Fineman seeks to inject state policy with an awareness of human 
vulnerability.57 And a collaboration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) activists and allies, in a document called “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: 
A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships,” proposes that 
state economic support for family relations should no longer be channeled 
through marriage, but that the state should recognize the variety of different 
structures of intimate life being generated in civil society.58 
Another entry point for structural critique of gender and class for legal 
theorists is international and comparative work that pushes for the United 
States to recognize social and economic rights recognized elsewhere in the 
world.  Feminist activists and policymakers have long pointed to work and 
family policies of other countries in order to motivate change in the United 
States.59 Some activists advocate using international human rights law, or the 
example of nations that recognize social and economic rights as fundamental, to 
foment a social movement in the United States to reconstruct regimes of 
governance in order to disrupt the class exploitation of workers in the gendered 
spheres of both market and family.60 
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One of the principal obstacles to movement in this direction has been the 
political impossibility of challenging capitalism, as we know it, in the wake of 
the Cold War. As global environmental concerns become increasingly urgent, 
however, radically reshaping relations of production, consumption, and 
exchange may suddenly be possible.61 If this becomes the case, gender analyses 
of economic relations are essential to making changes that will be just. 
From the perspective of structural analysis, then, family and market 
relations rather than “gender” or “class” per se are the targets of reform. 
IV 
CLASS, GENDER, AND PERSONHOOD 
Probably the least familiar aspect of the relationship between gender and 
class (to legal scholars) is how economic practices and institutions converge 
with the gender system to diminish the personhood of certain individuals and 
groups and leave them vulnerable to what Iris Marion Young calls the “five 
faces of oppression”: economic exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence.62 In this analysis we return to individuals and 
groups rather than social structures and practices, but rather than being 
concerned with discrimination—treating some groups differently than other 
groups—we are concerned with how the gender system and economic system 
together stigmatize some people as deserving of less respect than others, on the 
symbolic level, and make them vulnerable to physical and mental abuse, at the 
material level. 
Dominance feminism recognized long ago that under our contemporary 
gender system, women are not treated as full persons; men are the measure of 
the human, and women are treated as less than men along all axes deemed 
important.63 The dominance feminists argued that liberal reforms to get women 
equal treatment with men miss the point: if maleness is built on the denigration 
of the female, feminists should not try to be equal to men, but rather should 
tear down the very edifice of gender, which rests on a foundation of woman-
hating. Postmodern feminists, inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, 
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developed a more general theory of “subjection,” arguing that even before we 
reach the question of whether this group or that should be given “equal” rights, 
we have to look at the networks of power in which selves—or “subjects”—are 
recognized in the first place.64 Systems of subordination, in producing collective 
identities like “male,” “black,” or “handicapped,” produce some identities that 
are considered deserving of less respect than others. As in MacKinnon’s work, 
the argument is that we should look at the process by which this happens rather 
than only criticize the result. 
The understanding of “class” that is most helpful from this perspective is 
neither identitarian nor Marxist. Rather, it is useful to begin with capitalism’s 
great power, which from a moral standpoint is also its fatal flaw: its ability to 
turn all entities, including human beings, into objects—commodities—for 
others’ profit. The Atlantic slavery trade is the most obvious example of what 
this perspective on human relations can produce. Though state regulation 
during slavery in the United States never ceded complete power over slaves to 
the market, the treatment of humans as chattels made possible new levels of 
economic profit and wealth creation, as well as new sorts of human cruelty and 
misery.65 Capitalism’s ability to turn all entities, living or not, into commodities 
is conventionally checked by state power, which through law draws a line 
between “the state” and “the market” and endows humans with inviolable 
rights.66 Yet the interaction of capitalism with systems of social subordination 
like gender and race means that groups not accorded full personhood are 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and 
violence in both state and non-state arenas. 
The overlapping issues of human trafficking, modern-day slavery, and the 
sex industry provide an example. Although human slavery is no longer 
facilitated by American law—indeed, slavery is now constitutionally 
prohibited—economic incentives ensure that extreme forms of exploitation 
continue to flourish, in the United States and elsewhere.67 When slavery 
interacts with gender domination, the result is that slave labor, like labor in the 
formal market, becomes gendered: women and children, lacking relative power 
under the gender system, are most likely to be the commodities trafficked, and 
men most likely to be the consumers. The convergence of capitalism and the 
gender system produces the contemporary sex industry, in which human 
interactions customarily left to the “private,” family sphere occur in the market 
sphere. There is a raging debate among feminists about whether sex work is 
inherently unjust and degrading to women and children, or whether there are 
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some forms of sex work which are no different from any other kind of labor 
under capitalism.68 We need not take sides in this argument, however, to 
recognize that at least in some niches of the sex industry, human rights go so 
unrecognized, or are so little enforced, that the exploited parties are left 
vulnerable to the complete dehumanization of which capitalism is capable.69 
Another example of how capitalism and gender converge in ways that 
produce injustice at the level of subjection has to do with economic 
marginalization and the social powerlessness it produces. As Dean Spade 
observes, 
Trans people are disproportionately poor because of employment discrimination, 
family rejection, [and] troubles accessing school, medical care, and social services. 
These factors increase our rates of participation in criminalized work to survive, and 
that, combined with the profiling engaged in by police, produces high levels of 
criminalization. Once imprisoned, trans people face high levels of harassment and 
violence in both men’s and women’s facilities. Violence against trans women in men’s 
prisons is consistently reported by prisoners themselves as well as researchers.70 
Trans people do not only have limited access to employment because of 
employment discrimination; they also, because of the lack of recognized social 
and economic rights in the United States, cannot get access to the medical care 
that allows them to live safe and dignified lives without a certain income level. 
With respect to the state, trans people are frequently not treated as legitimate 
legal persons to begin with. Identity documentation, crucial to the receipt of 
human services and state benefits, as well as employment, commonly requires 
an official gender designation. Trans people, whose gender identities vary from 
the gender identity imposed on them at birth, find themselves subject to 
hundreds of informal and formal policies at the federal, state, and local levels 
concerning gender reclassification.71 As Spade points out, these policies are 
often unclear and often conflicting, adding to the economic marginalization of 
trans people. As Spade further observes, one end point for economically 
marginalized people is the criminal justice system, the final repository of the 
powerless. A prison record, of course, makes subsequent employment vastly 
less likely, ensuring a life on the economic margins. And prison itself is 
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characterized by high levels of violence, including sexual violence.72 Thus 
poverty, crime, and criminal justice feed on one another to place trans people at 
society’s margins. And like prostitutes, trans people are vulnerable to “private” 
violence based on the public perception that they are not entitled to the same 
human dignity and respect as others. 
A theoretical perspective that examines the convergence of gender and class 
with respect to person-making points to the potential for importation into social 
and psychic relations of capitalist dehumanization, the “thingification” of one’s 
self or aspects of one’s self—such as one’s sexuality—that are taken to be 
central to human dignity.73 The interaction of gender hierarchy and capitalist 
relations makes it possible for people to view themselves and one another as 
commodities, objects, with value conferred by the marketplace, rather than 
subjects of desire.74 Indeed, perhaps both the gender system we have and 
capitalism demand dehumanization. Margaret Baldwin argues that the process 
of subjection as a female subject demands the abjection of the prostitute,75 and it 
might also be argued that the process of subjection as an economic citizen 
demands the abjection of the homeless. Social abjection combined with 
capitalist commodification makes the violation of the Kantian ethic,76 and 
violence against human bodies and spirits, eminently possible. 
What kinds of legal reforms make sense from this perspective? 
Strengthening the “human rights” of those most vulnerable to economic 
exploitation—for example, more effective enforcement of anti-trafficking laws 
and more humane regulation of prostitution constitute possible areas of public 
reform.77 The implementation of currently nonexistent economic and social 
rights would lessen the vulnerability of humans to the abuses of 
commodification. Finally, some theorists have attempted to locate concern for 
human dignity within the “private” law of contract itself.78 This project could do 
for U.S. law what the South African constitution does for South African law: 
make equality rights “horizontal” rights that pervade the private as well as the 
public sphere.79 From a personhood perspective, then, law’s task is to thwart the 
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Writing this paper has felt strangely “old-school.” Perhaps that is 
appropriate. Now that nostalgia for the 1980s is in full bloom, why not don my 
leg warmers, put Boy George on the record player,80 and ponder grand theories 
of gender and class? Perhaps, however, it is also appropriate in these final 
paragraphs to consider why and how the activity of abstractly theorizing the 
relationship of gender and class feels so old-school in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. 
It surely is not that theory, gender, or class has disappeared. Contrary to the 
deepest hopes of generations of revolutionaries, neither gender nor class has 
withered away; and contrary to the wishes of countless generations of anti-
intellectuals, theorizing is not going anywhere either. But post-modernity has 
caught up with us, intellectually and socially. We need not Google “Third 
World Feminism” or “Jacques Derrida” to recognize that gender is like Orion 
or the Big Dipper: real yet at the same time a pattern wholly dependent on 
one’s standpoint. It is a constellation that can never be fully disentangled from 
race, class, nation, disability, sexuality, or myriad other factors. And as the 
beginning of this paper suggests, class as a concept has been in this sort of crisis 
for even longer than gender, which held together for a shining moment in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s as the cultural superstructure of “sex.” (And then 
“sex,” supposedly biological and hence “natural,” unitary, and immutable, 
began to crumble, and the queers broke away from feminism to make their own 
thing, which oscillates uneasily between assimilationism and nearly pure anti-
essentialism.)81 The recognition that a Theory of Everything, a thread that when 
pulled would unravel the entire tapestry of subordination, was not forthcoming 
also seeped into political activism. There are no all-encompassing grassroots 
social movements now comparable to the heydays of the International Workers 
of the World or Women’s Liberation. 
There are, instead, both in theorizing and in practice (hopefully we have 
kept from the 1980s the recognition that the two are never separate), the 
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ambition to keep our categories provisional and our alliances always open to 
change. If gender, class, and the rest are interconnected (not interchangeable), 
theorizing these concepts is a pragmatic enterprise—directed not toward 
discovering a fixed truth but finding a useful tool in the present moment. For 
that reason, my old-school exercise immediately became a garden of forking 
paths: an exercise in identifying possible maps, scaled for different uses. 
Identity-based, structural, dominance analyses of gender and class—all 
provisional and dispensable, none the key to anything else, but all paths that 
may facilitate theorizing in the present moment. Identifying and distinguishing 
the paths has been my purpose, and perhaps this modest and pragmatic aim 
perfectly suits the present day. 
 
